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Witness Name: David Sibbick
Statement No: 1
Exhibits: WITN0335_01/01 —
WITNO335_01/13
Date: nb: OF: 9.009.
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF DAVID SIBBICK
I, David Sibbick, will say as follows:
1. I make this statement in response to the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry’s rule 9
request dated 25 May 2022. It is made in ‘Question & Answer’ format reflecting
the questions in the request.
2. At the time of making this statement, I am 80 years’ old and retired.
Question 1. Please set out a brief professional background.
3. I started my career in the Civil Service in or around 1960. My first post was as an
Executive Officer dealing with human resources matters in the Post Office when it
was still a Government department. At the time it was incorporated as Post Office
Limited (‘POL’), I moved into a post at an equivalent level dealing with various
forms of radio communications’ licensing in the newly created Ministry of Post and
Telecommunications (MPT’). I was later appointed Private Secretary to the
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry. The MPT was subsequently absorbed into
the Department of Trade and industry (‘DTI'). I spent the rest of my Civil Service
career in DTI or various iterations of it, dealing with a variety of policy areas
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including postal services, radio communications, and international trade and
regulation.
4. Of particular note is that in the mid-1970s I served as Secretary to a major
Committee of Inquiry under the chairmanship of Sir Charles Carter into the future
of the Post Office. A key recommendation of our Committee was that the postal
and telecommunications businesses of the Post Office should be separated and
run as entirely separate businesses. This recommendation was subsequently
implemented by Margaret Thatcher's Government.
5. In July 1989, at the time Sir Nicholas Ridley was appointed Secretary of State for
Trade and Industry (‘SSTI’), I was promoted to the position of Director of Posts.
In this role I was responsible (jointly with Her Majesty’s Treasury (‘HMT’)) for
monitoring the Government's interest in POL in its ownership capacity. My day-
to-day responsibilities included briefing ministers, preparing parliamentary debate
briefings, preparing for parliamentary questions, dealing with ministerial
correspondence from the public, and maintaining relationships with various
stakeholders including other Government departments and postal unions such as
the National Federation of SubPostmasters (‘NFSP’) and the Communication
Workers Union (‘CWU’). I also represented the UK’s postal interests on an
international level — for example, I led the UK delegation to the Universal Postal
Union’s' International Postal Congress in 1994 and chaired the European Postal
Regulators Committee between 1991 and 1994. I remained in this post until my
retirement from the Civil Service toward the end of 2000.
' A United Nations agency coordinating postal policies amongst member nations.
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6. Following my retirement from the Civil Service 1 was recruited to the position of
Regulatory Director at DX Delivery Services which dealt primarily with the
overnight delivery of legal mail. From 2005 I continued to provide regulatory
advice to DX for a further 3 years, but on a part-time and consultancy basis.
During this time I also served (first) as Secretary and (subsequently) as Chairman
of the Mail Competition Forum, a trade association representing the interests of
the private sector mail operators. In 2011, I permanently retired from paid
employment.
Question 2. Please set out the background to your involvement in the Horizon
project.
7. I was aware from early on in my term as Director of Posts of the long-running sore
between the Benefits Agency (‘BA’) and Post Office Counters Limited ((POCL’).
Each believed the other to be taking unfair advantage of what was in effect a
captive situation. Years later I recall a senior official in the Department of Social
Security (‘DSS’) telling me that there was scarcely an official in the senior echelons
of that department who did not bear the scars of involvement in the BA/POCL
squabbles at some point in their career.
8. But BA had a very specific grievance. Up until that point, although benefit
claimants could opt to receive their payments through automated credit transfer
(‘ACT’), a large majority opted instead to receive their payments in cash at a post
office counter. This latter option was administered through a pension or other
benefit book and this (essentially paper-based) system was open to widespread
fraud, the cost of which had to be borne by BA. This highly — from BA's viewpoint
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~ unsatisfactory situation led BA at some point in the early 1990s to demand from
Government the right to insist that all benefits should henceforth be paid by ACT.
9. The flip side to this argument was that the income which individual post offices
earned from BA, supplemented by income from conducting other Government
business, together with the trade generated on the private side of many post
offices, meant that without the ‘footfall’ generated by the existing BA payment
method, potentially many thousands of post offices up and down the country would
become uneconomic and forced to close.
10.As described in the Annex to Briefing for Ministerial Meeting on Horizon dated 9
September 1998 (WITN0335_01/1), a leak of BA’s demand to Government led to
a very substantial ‘save our post offices’ protest campaign (probably orchestrated
by the NFSP) that had Ministers scurrying for some form of compromise. Thus, in
1993 was Horizon born. This £1 billion and hugely ambitious project (in terms of
size, if nothing else), set up under the auspices of the Government's much vaunted
Private Finance Initiative (‘PFI’), envisaged a tripartite partnership of BA, POCL
and ICL Pathway Limited (1CL’) to develop a system that would put electronic
terminals capable of reading a plastic card with magnetic stripe into every post
office. This card — the benefits payment card (‘BPC’) — would replace the existing
paper-based payment system and drastically reduce the scope for fraud ~ a key
BA objective.
4
a
.It is perhaps worth noting here, in view of what followed later, that the BPC would
be a ‘dumb’ card, with little or no development potential, in sharp contrast to a
‘smart’ card with far greater flexibility and development potential. And no less
significantly, the Horizon platform had been designed around the BPC with the
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batch transmission of data overnight from post office terminals to BA. I believe
that when experts subsequently examined the system in 1998, they accepted that
much of the development work around the BPC had been completed and
appeared to be broadly acceptable. So moving away from the BPC would mean
not only scrapping the work done on the BPC itself, but also reconfiguring the
remainder of Horizon to work in an online environment.
12. However the BA, POCL and ICL ‘marriage a trois’ seems to have been in difficulty
almost from the outset, with each of the parties blaming one or both of the others
for lack of progress. Certainly by the Autumn of 1997, both BA and POCL had
placed ICL in breach of contract, because the project was by that time running
some two years late and substantially over budget. BA’s position remained as it
had been throughout, that the only safe and cost-effective way to deliver benefit
payments was through ACT. At this point DSS views were largely in sympathy
with BA, and HMT sympathies (at least as seen from within DTI) also veered in
that direction.
13.DTI came to the party with two quite distinct but in the event complementary
concerns. Firstly, a substantial collapse of the network of post offices would create
an immense problem of political management, not to mention the untold misery
and hardship caused to a generation of subpostmasters whose livelihoods (and in
many cases, pensions) would have been decimated at a stroke, and local
communities deprived of a much-valued facility. Secondly, there was DTI’s
sponsorship of the electronics sector. The failure of Horizon — and with it the
probable collapse of ICL — would be seen as a massive blow to the sector and to
the Government's promotion of PFI, and the effect on Fujitsu would severely
damage future prospects of inward investment from Japan and elsewhere.
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14. Finally, as background, at the time of the Horizon review, there was a second
major review running simultaneously and falling within the purview of a separate
team in DTI. This was known as the ‘Post Office Review’ that was set up to give
effect to the Blair Government's commitment (made in opposition) to examine the
scope for granting POL greater commercial freedom whilst remaining in the public
sector. Clearly the future of POCL as a significant arm of the POL was dependent
on securing a satisfactory outcome on Horizon, and to this effect I periodically
contributed to briefings prepared by the Post Office Review team within DTI.
Question 3. Please consider BEIS0000127, BEISO0001. 28, BEIS0000129,
BEIS0000130, BEIS0000131, BEIS0000135, BEIS0000136, BEIS0000137,
BEIS0000138, BEIS0000139, BEIS0000140, BEIS00001 41, BEIS0000142,
BEIS0000157, BEIS0000158, BEIS0000159, BEIS00001 61, BEISO000162,
BEIS0000174, BEIS0000187, BEIS0000188, BEIS00001 89, BEIS0000283,
BEIS0000284, BEIS0000318, BEIS0000341, BEIS0000422, BEIS0000431,
BEIS0000432.
Question 3a. Please explain the problems faced by the Horizon project between
the Spring and Autumn of 1998.
15.By the beginning of the period between Spring and Autumn 1998, the Horizon
project was running some two years late and substantially over budget. Under
pressure from Ministers in DSS, and concerned at the fraud savings foregone, the
Government had asked DTI and DSS officials under HMT leadership to review the
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project. This group of officials was called the ‘Horizon Working Group’ (HWG
1998’)?
16.It is worth noting that on a project of Horizon’s complexity and scale, technical
issues were so far out of the expertise of Ministers and officials that experts were
needed to report on them. For this reason the HWG 1998 in turn commissioned
an expert group under the chairmanship of Adrian Montague (‘Expert Group’) to
report on the project's technical viability. Ministers and officials were effectively
reliant on these experts to inform us of technical issues, and in effect these would
only be escalated to a political level if they were ‘killer’ issues that might affect
decision-making on Horizon.
17. The resulting report — the Review of the Benefits Agency/Post Office Counters
Automation Project by the HWG 1998 (WITN0335_01/2) referring to the BA/POCL
Automation Programme Review Report by the Expert Group (WITN0335_01/3) —
was put to Ministers on 22 July 1998 . It concluded that the project was technically
viable, and likely to be robust and acceptably ‘future proof as is said in my
submission to SSTI on 30 July 1998 (WITN0335_01/4). I also recall that KPMG
reached a similar view at a later stage®.
Question 3b. What did you understand about technical difficulties with Horizon
at this time?
? This working group was distinct from the ‘Horizon Working Group’ addressed in Question 11 below
that was created in 1999 and initially chaired by lan McCartney, which shared a similar name but
performed a different function. For ease of reference, the later ‘Horizon Working Group’ will be
referred to as ‘'HWG 1999’.
* See for example the summary of key findings of Horizon Working Group report and KPMG report
dated 6 November 1998 (WITN0335_01/5) which states on Page 3: ‘KPMG have confirmed that
Option 2 is technically and commercially feasible.’
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18.The report of the Expert Group identified a considerable number of possible,
probable and forecast technical issues that would need to be addressed as the
project moved forward. However, having carefully considered all of these, their
overall conclusion was that, as noted at paragraph 17 above, the project was
technically viable and likely to be robust and acceptably future proof. The Horizon
Group endorsed this conclusion in their report to Ministers of July 1998, and I also
recall that KPMG reached a similar view at a late stage.
19.In other words, so far as DTI ministers were concerned, there were no ‘killer’
difficulties that could be cited as a reason to cancel Horizon or impede satisfactory
completion. I was personally not aware of any additional technical difficulties at
this time.
Question 3c. Was there agreement between Government departments as to the
future of Horizon? If not, what were the respective Positions as you recall them?
20. The report of the Expert Group concluded that there might be a further nine-month
delay to the project, and suggested three main families of options: continue with
the project provided satisfactory terms could be negotiated with ICL (Option 1);
continue with the Horizon infrastructure but without the BPC (Option 2); and cancel
the project (Option 3).
21.Whilst DTI remained firmly in favour of Option 1, DSS argued strongly for Option
2, to allow an earlier move to ACT, whilst parallel provision of ‘front end’ banking
services would be established. DSS envisaged BA migrating to ACT over three
years from October 2001, and in consequence POCL would need to establish
banking facilities by that date.
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Question 4. Please consider BEIS0000104.
Question 4a. Please explain the purpose behind the Horizon Project Review
Group.
Question 4b. Did the Group consider issues concerning technical difficulties
with Horizon?
Question 4c. If so, was it successful in doing so? Please explain the reasons
for your answer.
22.1 have very little recollection of the work of this Horizon Project Review Group. It
clearly started out with somewhat grandiose ideas, and I suspect that what may
have happened was that Ministers (or more senior officials) decided that what was
needed was a higher-powered group with a sharper focus and this became the
HWG 1998, supported by an Expert Group to address the more technical issues
(please see my answer to Question 3a above).
Question 5. Please consider BEIS0000284, BEIS0000318, BEIS0000283.
Question 5a. How would you describe the Government's relationship with ICL
between the Spring and Autumn of 1998?
23.1 knew from my informal discussions with ICL that they were aware that DTI was
for the most part batting in their corner within Government — for which they were
grateful — whilst DSS had a different agenda. They were of course equally aware
that once a Government line had been agreed, then publicly DT! would be fully
committed to it. ICL would cooperate fully in attempts to find a satisfactory
solution, but it had to be one that made commercial sense for them.
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Question 6. Please consider BEIS0000101, BEIS0000103, BEIS0000177,
BEIS0000178, BEIS0000179, BE!IS0000180, BEIS0000181, BEIS0000393,
BEIS0000394, BEIS0000395, BEIS0000396, BEIS0000400, BEIS0000404,
BEIS0000408, BEIS0000413, BEIS0000417, BEIS0000418, BEIS0000419.
Question 6a. Please explain the position in respect of the adoption of Horizon
as at November and December 1998.
24.As October 1998 turned into November, and November into December, the
familiar arguments for and against proceeding with one option or another, though
dressed up in increasingly complex financial projections, ebbed and flowed. Even
a letter dated 10 December 1998 from SSTI Peter Mandelson to Chief Secretary
of HMT Stephen Byers (WITN0335_01/6) and copied to the Prime Minister failed
to open up a crack in the logjam. And ICL seemed to suddenly have acquired the
knack of irritating everyone. Invitation after invitation from officials to Ministers to
take decisions went unanswered. My submission dated 22 December 1998 to
SSTI (WITNO335_01/7) and the draft letter it covered from SSTI to the Prime
Minister (WITN0335_01/8) give some flavour of that frustration.
Question 6b. What did you understand of technical difficulties at this time?
25.1 was not aware of any technical difficulties at this time, nor do I recall them playing
any significant part in the events of November and December 1998.
Question 6c. Was there agreement between Government departments as to the
future of Horizon? If not, what were the respective positions as you recall them?
26. The positions of DSS and DTI remained substantially unchanged at this time. The
position of HMT appeared more open to the argument that a wholesale move of
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benefits recipients to compulsory ACT was unlikely to be achievable in practice
and would in any case leave the Government with a range of extremely difficult
political issues.
Question 7. Please consider BEIS0000166, BEIS0000167, BEIS000021 8,
BEIS0000358, BEIS0000359, BEIS0000360, BEIS0000361, BEIS0000362,
BEIS0000363, BEIS0000364, BEIS0000365, BEIS0000366, BEIS0000367,
BEIS0000368, BEIS0000369, BEIS0000371, BEIS0000373BEIS0000375,
BEIS0000376, BEIS0000377, BEIS0000378, BEIS0000379, BEIS0000380,
BEIS0000381, BEIS0000382, BEIS0000383 BEIS0000384, BEIS0000385,
BEIS0000386, BEIS0000388, BEIS0000389, BEIS0000390, BEIS0000391,
BEIS0000392, BEIS0000393, BEIS0000441.
Question 7a. Please explain the position in respect of the adoption of Horizon
between January and April 1999.
27.Perhaps the most significant development between January and April 1999 was
the intervention of No 10 Downing Street (‘No 10’) on two occasions making clear
that the Prime Minister (Tony Blair) was not looking for an outcome that involved
walking away from Horizon or ICL. The first occasion was in January 1999 by way
of correspondence from the Prime Minister’s Principal Private Secretary, Jeremy
Heywood*. The second occasion was in March 1999 by way of another letter from
Jeremy Heywood®. No 10’s involvement was immediately decisive in effectively
4 This letter is referred to in the first paragraph of a draft letter from SSTI to the Prime Minister
circulated by email on 20 January 1999 (WITN0335_01/9) (WITNO335_01/10), which dates the letter
as 14 January 1999. At the time of making this statement I understand that a copy of the letter is not
available (nor is the advice prompting it).
© Letter from 10 Downing Street to HMT Treasury dated 1 March 1999 (WITN0335_01/11)
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removing from any further discussion the option of walking away from ICL or
Horizon
28. Despite this, the four-month period ended with no agreement on a way forward.
As seen in my submission to SSTI dated 16 April 1999 (WITNO335_ 01/12), DTI
concluded that Option B (Horizon with a smartcard) was too expensive, whilst
Option A (Horizon with the BPC) was not deliverable, not for technical reasons but
because of the dysfunctional relationship between the contracting parties.
Question 7b. What did you understand of technical difficulties at this time?
29.I was not aware of any technical difficulties at this time, nor do I recall them playing
any significant part in the events between January and April 1999.
Question 7c. Was there agreement between Government departments as to the
future of Horizon? If not, what were the respective positions as you recall them?
30. DSS and BA maintained their view that the BPC represented a technological dead-
end; DTI maintained its view which at least in principle was now aligned with that
of No 10; and both POCL and ICL in different ways had difficulty in finding numbers
that would work for them.
Question 8. Please consider BEIS0000190, BEIS0000241, BEIS0000250,
BEIS0000275, BEIS0000342, BEIS0000343, BEIS0000345, BEIS0000352,
BEIS0000355, BEIS0000439, BEIS0000440.
Question 8a. Please explain the Position in respect of the adoption of Horizon
between May to July 1999.
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31.During this period the plethora of options that had sprung up like mushrooms in
the preceding months were swept away by a bilateral agreement between POCL
and ICL, lubricated in POCL’s case by £480 million contribution from HMT, to take
forward the Horizon platform on an ongoing commercial development basis. BA
got its commitment to a glide path to ACT, and it would be for POCL and ICL to
ensure that the roll out of Horizon to all post offices was completed in time,
together with agreements with commercial banks, to retain and attract both
existing and new ACT customers. Both the HWG 1998 plus its Expert Group, and
the more recent iteration made up of postal trade union representatives (the HWG
1999)®, would continue to support the ongoing Horizon project.
Question 8b. What did you understand of technical difficulties at this time?
32.1 was not aware of any technical difficulties at this time, nor do I recall them playing
any significant part in the events between May and July 1999.
Question 8c. Was there agreement between Government departments as to the
future of Horizon? If not, what were the respective positions as you recall them?
33.In the end, not everyone got exactly what they wanted, but perhaps most got a
deal that they thought they could at least live with. DSS secured their commitment
to a start date for moving their benefit recipients to ACT. DTI avoided the loss of
a major player in the electronics sector, the risk of future investment prospects,
and damage to the PFI brand. HMT, which also would have wanted to avoid
damage to the PFI brand, were also able to resolve a very difficult issue which
may have left the Government in an embarrassing position.
® Please see answers to questions 3 above and 11 below
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Question 9. Please consider BEIS0000278, BEIS0000313, BEIS0000314,
BEIS0000315, BEIS0000331, BEIS0000334, BEIS0000336, BEIS0000337, in
addition to those already identified.
Question 9a. To what extent did the financial impact of not proceeding with
Horizon play a role in its adoption?
Question 9b. To what extent did wider concerns of international relations and
the economy play a part in the adoption of Horizon?
34. The financial impact on the network of post offices and the subpostmasters who
earn their living within it, the blow to the UK electronics sector and more widely,
the damage to Fujitsu and the likely negative impact on inward investment from
Japan and more widely, and the damage to the image of the UK’s PF} initiative no
doubt played a significant part in the thinking of those who fought against attempts
to terminate the Horizon project.
Question 10. To what extent do you consider that your responses to the above
impacted on the focus on the technical abilities/robustness of Horizon prior to
agreement with ICL?
35. Issues concerning the technical abilities/robustness of Horizon were taken care of
by the HWG 1998 and in particular the Expert Group which supported it. Since
none were reported to Ministers at this time, their focus remained on these wider
issues.
Question 11, Please consider BEIS0000231, BEIS0000239, BEIS0000250,
BEIS0000345, BEIS0000346, BEIS0000347, BEIS0000348, BEIS0000352,
BEIS0000353, BEIS0000354.
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Question 11a. What was the purpose of the Horizon Working Group?
36.Confusingly, there were two Horizon Working Groups. The first group (HWG
1998) was set up by Ministers to provide advice on the ongoing Horizon project at
a time when there were substantial interdepartmental differences of opinion on the
way forward (please see my answer to Question 3a above). This group was
chaired by HMT officials, including Steve Robson at the more critical junctures,
and was supported by an Expert Group chaired by Adrian Montague.
37.The second group (HWG 1999) was set up under the chairmanship of lan
McCartney, and its membership included the Managing Director of POCL and one
of his senior managers, and the General Secretaries of the NFSP, CWU, and the
Communication Managers Association. The purpose of this group was twofold.
First, it was a channel to keep these key stakeholders informed of ongoing political
issues related to Horizon’. Second, it was a valuable source of practical hands-
on experience from those whose job it would be to operate the system when it was
eventually rolled out.
Question 11b. What role did consideration of the technical abilities/robustness
of Horizon play in this Group?
38.1 do not recall any such discussions.
Question 12. Please consider BEIS0000349, BEIS0000350, BEIS0000347.
’ For example, any issues with the roll-out as it developed — see the steering brief dated 8 October
1999 for fifth HWG 1999 meeting (WITNO335_01/13).
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Question 12a. What do you recall of the NFSP’s position insofar as any
concerns about the technical abilities/robustness of Horizon to have been prior
to its roll out?
39.A reliable and easy to use Horizon system was of massive importance to the NFSP
and its members, and one whose roll-out was completed in time for the benefit
payments transfer to ACT, since their livelihoods depended on it. However, once
the roll-out started, I had little further involvement in it until the time I left the Civil
Service, and I do not recall the NFSP ever raising technical issues with me.
Question 13. Please consider BEIS0000236.
Question 13a. What understanding did you have of the technical issues referred
to at paragraph 5 of this submission?
Question 13b. What do you recall of the Government’s and civil service’s
knowledge of and position on these technical issues?
40. The technical issues referred to were the changes that needed to be made to the
Horizon infrastructure to adapt it for its new role which was no longer to be centred
around the BPC. This was not to imply that there were technical problems, but
rather that there was some — perhaps quite a lot of — further development work
still needed.
Question 14. Please consider BEIS0000119.
Question 14a. What understanding did you have of the two technical issues that
existed as at August 1999?
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41.1 understood that there were the two minor ‘technical blips’ as described in the
document. My recollection is that these were rapidly resolved by ICL, and after
thorough testing by POCL, the Horizon system was formally accepted by POCL.
Question 14b. What do you recall of the Government's and civil service's
knowledge of and position on these technical issues?
42.The issue and its subsequent resolution were very properly reported to
Government since it could potentially have delayed acceptance of Horizon by
POCL with a knock-on effect on the roll-out of the system. In the event, there was
no delay. Essentially however, this was purely an operational issue and resolved
in an operational context.
Question 15. Please consider BEIS0000436.
Question 15a. Please explain what the Purpose of the Performance and
Innovation Unit was.
43.My understanding of the Performance and Innovation Unit was that it had been
set up as a kind of Prime Minister’s Department able to look at issues that spanned
a number of Government departments. I recall a number of discussions with them,
mainly explaining as background for them POL, POCL’s place within it, the work
we had been doing on Horizon and how that fitted into the wider Post Office
Review which had been running in parallel.
Question 15b. Do you recall any discussion with the Performance and
Innovation Unit as to technical issues with Horizon? If So, please set this out.
44.1 do not recall discussing any technical issues with them.
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Question 16. Please consider BEIS0000229, BEIS0000264, BEIS0000265,
BEIS0000311, BEIS0000312.
Question 16a. What understanding did you have of the technical and help desk
problems that existed as at October and November 1999?
45. Please see my answer to Questions 14a and 14b above. This is the same issue,
though I have no recollection of help desks being included in the list of issues.
Question 16b. What did you understand the “importance we attach to achieving
on target roll-out” in BEISO000265 to mean?
46. The importance attached to the on target roll-out of the Horizon system into all
post offices was so that they would have the best opportunity of picking up
business from benefit recipients when these were compulsorily transferred to ACT,
thus maintaining as much as possible of their traditional footfall.
47.1 am absolutely certain that the importance attached to this by Ministers did not
cause Horizon to be rolled-out before it was ready. It was a matter for POCL to
accept whether it was ready, and I do not believe it would have agreed to
acceptance under time pressure if it thought there was a risk that Horizon would
not work — it was in their interest for the system to work properly.
Question 16c. How do you consider this impacted on the technical and help
desk problems that had been identified?
48.I have no reason to believe that it would have had any impact. We were advised
that the issues had been resolved and that Horizon had been tested to the
satisfaction of the contracting parties. As far as we were concerned, it was the
end of the story.
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Question 17. Looking back, do you feel that the Government effectively
scrutinised the procurement, pilot, and rollout of Horizon?
49. Yes. Ministers received the best advice available and took decisions on that basis.
I do not know what more Ministers could have asked for, or what we in DTI could
have provided them. It was not the role of Ministers to become deeply involved at
an operational level, or for DTI to micromanage POL. I am anyway far from certain
that additional scrutiny would have yielded any better result.
Question 18. Do you feel that you Properly informed Ministers of the technical
issues relating to Horizon?
50. Identifying technical issues was the specific task of the HWG 1998 and the Expert
Group that reported to it. Were any such issues brought to our attention, I feel
very confident that we would have made quite sure that our Ministers knew about
them.
Question 19. Are there any other matters that you consider will assist the Chair?
51.No.
Statement of truth
I believe the content of this statement to be true.
co i I.
Date: 94-09-2099
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Index to First Witness Statement of David Sibbick
No. I Exhibit Number I Document Control URN
Description Number
1 WITN0335_01/1 I Annex to Briefing for I BEISO00109 I BEISO00129
Ministerial Meeting
on Horizon dated 9
September 1998
2 WITNO0335_01/2 I Review of the I VIS00007799 I HMT00000034
I Benefits I
I Agency/Post Office
Counters
Automation Project
3 WITNO335_01/3 I BA/POCL POL-0024576 I POL00028094
I Automation
Programme Review
Report
4 I WITNO335_01/4 I Submission to SSTII BEIS0000127 I BEIS0000141
dated 30 July 1998
5 WITNO335_01/5 I Summary of key I BEISO000161 I BEIS0000181
findings of Horizon
Working Group
report and KPMG
report dated 6
November 1998
6 WITN0335_01/6 I Letter from SSTI I BEISO000398 I BEIS0000418
Peter Mandelson to I
Chief Secretary of
HMT Stephen Byers
dated 10 December
I 1998
7 WITN0335_01/7 I Submission to SST! I BEIS0000374 I BEISO000304
dated 22 December
1998
8 I WITNO335_01/8 I Draft letter from I BEIS0000375 I BEIS0000305
SSTI to the Prime
Minister
9 WITN0335_01/9 I Email chain dated I BEISO000375 BEIS0000166
20 January 1999 I
I _ I
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WITNO03350100
WITN03350100
WITNO335_01/10I Draft letter from I BEISO000147 BEIS0000167
SSTI to the Prime
Minister dated 20
January 1999
WITNO335_01/11I Letter from 10 I BEISO000355 I BEISO000375
Downing Street to
HMT Treasury
dated 1 March 1999
WITN0335_01/12 I Submission to SSTI I BEISO000342 BEIS0000362
dated 16 April 1999
WITN0335_01/13 I Steering brief dated I BEIS0000211 BEIS0000231
8 October 1999 for
fifth HWG 1999
meeting
— os
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